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Egalitarianism today is usually taken to refer to a set of views about the 
just distribution of income, wealth and other goods. But this view unduly 
narrows the egalitarian agenda, which is broader than matters of distributive 
justice alone. In this essay, I chart how egalitarian ideas have developed 
from social movements whose primary interest has been forging a society 
of equals and battling against social hierarchies.1
The Levellers and a society of equals
Many forms of egalitarianism have taken something other than distributive 
justice as their starting point. The feminist movement is plainly egalitarian, 
seeking reproductive freedom for women, yet for women there is nothing 
that is being distributed equally in this case. LGBT activists seek the 
freedom to appear in public without shame or stigma. Activists in the 
American civil rights movement of the 1960s sought racial integration of 
schools, explicitly in repudiation of the doctrine ‘separate but equal’ – 
merely having equal resources was not enough. All of these movements 
are egalitarian, but their demands cannot always be captured in terms 
of equal distributions of income, resources, wealth or other goods. And 
I could give many more examples of the same sort.
So what are they after? They strive for a society of equals: a society in 
which people relate to one another as equals, whether it is in their day-
to-day interactions, across the major institutions of government, or in the 
workplace. This is a relational ideal which can be traced all the way back 
to the Levellers of the English civil war period, who represent the first 
recognisably egalitarian sociopolitical movement.
Much earlier in history, perhaps even with the birth of monotheistic religions, 
we see claims of the fundamental moral equality of souls – for instance, that 
all human beings are made in the image of God and are equally eligible in 
principle for salvation. Indeed, moral claims to equality are deeply rooted 
1 This essay and the responses to it are based on a talk given by Professor Anderson at IPPR on 13 June 2013. 
An audio recording of the event is available at https://soundcloud.com/ippr/a-history-of-egalitarianism.
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in the history of the three leading monotheistic religions today. However, 
if we see how that claim of moral equality actually played out, particularly 
in the history of Christianity, it had essentially no translation into social or 
political change. Equality was for the next life – in salvation, the souls would 
all commune with each other on equal terms, but not in this world. In this 
world, a kind of social hierarchy is needed to preserve social order, and all 
kinds of reasons were offered to justify various forms of social hierarchy, 
including slavery, serfdom, patriarchy, monarchy and lordship.
It is also the case that early in human history we find communities of people 
living on terms of equality with one another. Usually these are ascetic 
religious communities like the Essenes. But their renouncement of wealth 
for material equality was not done out of any political convictions about 
equality, rather for the sake of holiness. 
The Levellers, however, represented something distinctly new. For them, 
egalitarianism was a claim to social and political equality that was based on 
an assertion of the basic moral equality of human beings. The idea that we 
can translate the fundamental moral equality of human beings into matters 
of social and political policy for this world, that our moral equality grounds 
and justifies the establishment of the society of equals – these claims were 
first made at the time of the English civil wars.
What were the Levellers levelling? They were not engaged in a project of 
distributive justice as we would understand it today. In economic terms they 
were interested in removing monopoly: for their time, they were free-traders, 
although that also had a very different significance in the 17th century. 
Politically, their agenda was that of a universal male franchise – ‘one man, 
one vote’ – with representative districts of equal population, abolition 
of the lords’ privileges, the rule of law, and equality before the law, with 
laws passed by the House of Commons being equally valid for lords and 
commoners. Essentially, they were criticising the social hierarchy – this is 
what they were levelling. 
Dismantling social hierarchy
Levelling social hierarchies is at the root of all egalitarian movements. 
Sometimes that takes a fundamentally distributive focus, but if you see what 
unites all egalitarian movements – such as feminism, the struggle for racial 
equality and for the rights of people of different sexual orientation – it is a 
critique of social hierarchy and an aspiration to realise a society of equals, a 
society in which all citizens meet each other face to face with mutual respect 
and cooperation. The history of egalitarianism is the history of attempting to 
dismantle, or at least tame, social hierarchy. It is a history of experiments in 
living that seek to replace social hierarchy with relations among equals. 
Here I am defining social hierarchy in a particular way. It consists in 
durable group-based inequality that is sustained by systematic laws and 
habits. Every so often you hear, ‘well as long as the groups are grouped 
by ability then hierarchy is acceptable’. Yet one of the deep strands of 
critique emerging from the egalitarian movement is that meritocracy itself 
is an inherently unstable formation. Once people get to the top, they 
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want to ensure that their children receive the same privileges. And so 
meritocracy has systematic, inherent tendencies to resolve and reproduce 
itself along lines of group identity that are usually defined in ancestral or 
genealogical terms. 
There are three kinds of social hierarchy that egalitarians have historically 
been worried about, and considering these helps to expand our vision of 
what an egalitarian agenda looks like.
The first kind is hierarchies of domination and subjection. This is where 
some groups of people order other groups around, and where subordinates 
are powerless to hold their superiors accountable for the way they are being 
treated. The extreme case is slavery. Indeed, abolitionism was a major 
focus of egalitarianism. It is possible to be an abolitionist without being 
an egalitarian, but there were radical abolitionists who strongly advanced 
egalitarian agendas, particularly in the US and also in the connections 
between abolitionism and Chartism. In England, there was a move from 
the critique of slavery to the critique of wage slavery – not just chattel 
slavery, but all kinds of arbitrary subordination in the workplace.
The second hierarchy is of esteem. In this case some groups are 
stigmatised, ostracised or treated as pariahs on the basis, for example, 
of class, race or disability.
The third hierarchy is of standing. This occurs when, in deliberation and 
decision-making, some interests count more than others. We all make 
decisions, but the state makes decisions that dramatically affect the 
interests of others. Some people’s interests are taken into account while 
others’ are radically discounted or perhaps neglected altogether.
There is an important link between hierarchies of standing and distributive 
justice. The state constructs the fundamental rules of property and 
contract, taxation, inheritance and so forth. It can configure these rules and 
institutions in ways that treat everyone as being of equal importance, or it 
can slant and shape our distributive rules so as to favour certain privileged 
groups. Whether the rules underpinning distributive justice are set in an 
egalitarian way is dependent on the prevalence of hierarchies of standing.
Egalitarian thought and social movements 
My assessment of the history of egalitarianism also demonstrates that 
egalitarian social movements are the source of egalitarian ideas. These are 
then picked up by intellectuals, theorists and thinktanks, and are reworked 
with empirical support and more systematic theorising. Nonetheless, time 
and time again, we see creative thoughts bubbling up from the movements 
themselves. Hence, egalitarian thought has flourished when egalitarian 
social movements have flourished, and has tended to stagnate when the 
movements themselves are in periods of weakness or uncertainty.
This link between social movements and the development of ideas has 
other important implications. Egalitarians are constantly learning and 
developing in a pragmatic way. Egalitarianism means different things 
at different points in time, for different movements engaged in different 
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struggles. In part this is because a lot of what is happening in egalitarian 
social movements is – as we have already described it – ‘experiments in 
living’. Sometimes the movement is triumphant and wins a victory, achieves 
some item on its agenda, and it seems for a moment that everything is 
settled. But what is often discovered is that this not true, that the initial 
problem is not settled at all. 
A classic case of this is abolitionism in the US. At the point when slavery 
had been abolished with the enactment of the 13th amendment towards 
the end of the civil war, people were not sure what they had in fact 
abolished. This was because of the new labour regime that had been 
rapidly established for the freed people. This regime, while not a kind 
of chattel slavery, in that no one could be bought or sold on the auction 
block and families could not be sent to different plantation owners, was 
nevertheless extraordinarily oppressive. In many respects it was barely 
different from the slavery regime that had preceded it. People came to 
realise that the conditions of labour had to be thought through again. In the 
US context, that thinking was absolutely critical in motivating the labour 
movement. Indeed, the freed people were some of the earliest workers to 
organise, go on strike and revolt against oppressive labour laws. 
The abolition of slavery provides just one example of a movement achieving 
a major item on its agenda only to see that social hierarchy is endlessly 
creative. The work of egalitarianism is never done because social hierarchy 
is resourceful: it always has new ways of reconstituting itself. New agenda 
items have to be developed in response to this. 
This continued reinvention needs to respond to contemporary concerns 
as well. Egalitarians today should think back to the Levellers, and in 
particularly to their distinctively republican concern for hierarchies of 
domination and subjection. 
In the US, as the labour union movement has faded into virtual non-
existence in the private sector, we see a dramatic and highly aggressive 
reassertion of arbitrary domination of workers. Many American workers 
have no privacy in the workplace, no freedom of speech; they can be fired 
for expressing political opinions or for speaking a different language from 
the one approved by the boss. Outside of work, in most of the 50 states, 
workers can be and are sanctioned for their choice of domestic partner, for 
their political views, even for the way they dress. These forms of domination 
still exist today, and in the absence of a vibrant labour movement in the US 
there is a need for egalitarian thinking that has a wider agenda than just 
distribution. The left must revisit the rich tradition of social movements and 
ideas which took as their key goal the dismantling of social hierarchies.
Response: Ben Jackson, lecturer in modern 
history, Oxford University
I wish to focus on how Professor Anderson’s history of egalitarianism 
relates to the traditions of egalitarian thought that have played a role 
in British political history, traditions which continue to play a role in the 
debates that currently preoccupy the British left. 
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Equality has always been central to the identity and rhetoric of the British 
left, and the Labour party in particular, but there has always been a lively 
debate about exactly what a commitment to equality means and what it 
entails. Anderson’s arguments can help us to get a handle on some of these 
questions. In this response, I will make three points. 
The first point is about the distinction between relational and distributive 
equality. Anderson emphasises a vision of equality that is focused on social 
relations. By this account, the egalitarian aim is to replace social hierarchy 
with an equality of social standing so that people relate to each other as 
equals in the social and civic spheres. She contrasts that with what might 
be thought of as a kind of pure distributive theory of equality that is about 
the distribution of goods. 
There is much in this social relational vision that resonates with the history 
of egalitarian thought on the British left. For instance, the severe hierarchies 
of social status that were generated by the class system were a key 
preoccupation of classic egalitarians such as RH Tawney. In his seminal 
1931 book Equality, he criticised employers for developing what he called 
‘an extraordinarily overbearing tyrannous and irresponsible habit of mind’ 
which regarded workers as servants and promoted the idea that people are 
productive tools. The privilege and tyranny, as Tawney saw it, generated by 
class inequality created a spirit of domination and servility.
In this connection, we can also think about George Orwell’s Homage to 
Catalonia, in which he gives a very evocative description of what life was 
like in Barcelona during the Spanish civil war under the republican regime. 
He said that it was a city of rough economic equality and, as a result, 
it was a city in which social relationships were equal. The example that 
Orwell gave was that workers looked you in the face and greeted you as 
an equal. Servile and even ceremonial forms of speech had temporarily 
disappeared. In republican Barcelona, Orwell said, he had breathed the 
air of equality.
This gives us the flavour of the sort of egalitarian vision that Anderson 
is describing. However, importantly, there was a significant connection 
between distributive and relational equality in this tradition. The hierarchies 
of status and injuries to self-respect that these writers and activists 
opposed were in their view chiefly due to factors such as the nature of the 
workplace, the distribution of income and wealth and the places in which 
different social classes lived. What is more, egalitarians in this tradition 
cared about distributive inequality for other reasons as well – they were 
also concerned about the overall justice of material distribution as an 
independent matter.
My question for Professor Anderson is whether she has definitively to 
choose between distributive and relational equality? Or would we not want 
an account of the history of egalitarian social movements which says that 
they were animated by both distributive and relational concerns? There 
might then be a larger historical issue here as well. If Anderson is saying 
that all egalitarian movements in the past have been relational and that 
there was not much distributive egalitarianism in a strict sense, until the 
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vogue for distributive egalitarianism among contemporary political theories, 
then that would be a strong historical claim. 
The second point I want to make requires us to fast forward from Tawney 
and Orwell to Tony Blair. During the New Labour years, there was a rather 
unsatisfactory debate about whether Labour in government should pursue 
equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome. An emblematic 
moment of this debate was when Blair famously refused to say that he was 
troubled by the earnings of those at the top; he specifically mentioned the 
earnings of David Beckham in an interview with Jeremy Paxman and firmly 
refused to say that he thought it was wrong that some people were earning 
too much money. For egalitarian-inclined people, like me, this was Blair’s 
tipping-point moment. 
The debate in the Labour party about inequality at the top has moved on 
quite a long way since that interview, not least because there is now a 
sense that the extravagant share of earnings enjoyed by the richest has 
played a damaging economic role in squeezing the incomes of middle 
and lower earners. 
But what would Professor Anderson’s view be on Blair’s argument? In 
some of her earlier writings on equality, particularly her article ‘What is the 
point of equality?’ you could say that she has been attracted by a view not 
identical but similar to that of Blair. This is in the sense that in her writing 
she suggests that the most important distributive aspect of inequality to 
attend to is to provide a high enough minimum standard for the worst-off 
in society. Her contention is that everyone should receive enough to enable 
them to exercise democratic citizenship and to meet others as equals.
One question that arises, then, is what we should think about inequalities 
above that minimum threshold. Should we be intensely relaxed about 
people earning lots of money, provided that everyone has their minimum 
citizenship protected? To what extent are relational egalitarians concerned 
about reducing inequality at the top end or about providing a minimum 
standard? An alternative reading of Anderson’s view is that she does 
have a set of reasons for why we might care about inequality at the top; 
clearly, if the very rich end up exercising excessive influence on politics 
and becoming a privileged social elite then that would be of concern for 
a relational egalitarian.
My third point concerns the political value of contemporary philosophy. 
Professor Anderson contrasts her view of equality with the dominant ideas 
articulated in contemporary analytical philosophy. However, as a historian, 
I see a potential danger in downplaying the philosophical and political 
importance of this body of work. 
Of course, philosophers only rarely change the world in any fundamental 
sense, and it would be unrealistic to expect too much from academic 
philosophers, but the prominent place that has been occupied in recent 
philosophical debates by figures like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin or Gerry 
Cohen is of some significance. Philosophically, the work that was done in 
the analytical tradition has been quite important in clarifying the concepts 
and principles that underpin egalitarianism; we understand a lot more 
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about egalitarianism as a result of that work. Politically, the strength of their 
commitment to egalitarian values has also been important ballast at a time 
when egalitarian values have come under relentless attack from the right.
In the last 20 or 30 years, the hardest equality issues to think about and win 
on politically have been claims to egalitarian distribution, whether we think 
of egalitarian distribution as an objective in itself or as a means to other 
relational egalitarian goals. The analytical tradition of writing about equality 
has been quite important in keeping the flame of economic equality alive. 
This has been a time when, as Anderson has said, the labour movement 
has been pulled apart and pushed to the right, and when the dominant 
social discourse about economic inequality has an unreflective ideal of 
meritocracy. The discourse within the analytical tradition could be seen as 
a political resource for the critique of those kinds of trends. This is another 
reason why we might not want to set up too stark an antagonism between 
the relational account and contemporary analytical thinking about equality.
Response: Anne PhilLips, professor of political 
and gender theory at the London School 
of Economics
I really appreciate the way that Professor Anderson is restoring the 
connection between equality and democracy: not just the emphasis on 
equality being about domination and power differentials, but also the other 
side of that – democracy being primarily about equality. 
There has been a real shift in the way people think of democracy. They 
think too much in terms of the mechanisms of democracy: accountability, 
decision-making, competitive party elections. All of these things are of 
course very important, but as a system of accountability or a way of 
regulating corruption democracy has not actually been terribly impressive. 
There are very few democracies that have lived up to the kind of ideals that 
one might have hoped for. 
However, if you step back from these mechanisms and details and think 
about what is entailed in saying that all of us – regardless of class, sex, 
ethnicity, sexuality – actually have exactly the same standing in relation to 
the decisions that are supposed to govern our lives, it seems to me that 
this is the most amazing thing. The idea that societies would have come 
to that kind of view and committed themselves to the idea of that kind of 
democracy, even if they don’t practise it, is an astonishing achievement. 
You hear people in the tradition of political theory and science almost 
debating whether equality is a crucial component of democracy, or if 
democracy is primarily defined by other things. That seems to me to be 
deeply problematic, so one of the things that is important about what 
Anderson has said is about not just restoring the power issues to equality 
but also restoring the equality issues to democracy. 
The other very positive thing is Anderson’s focus on inequalities and 
hierarchies between groups rather than between individuals. This has been 
one of the real problems in the recent philosophical literature on equality. It 
has become caught up in questions about which inequalities are justified 
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and which are not, and it has pursued this through all kinds of hypothetical 
examples, allowing us to work out whether individual A was entitled to have 
more than individual B. At its simplest, this may take the form of asking 
whether an individual who works very much harder than someone else who 
spends all their time lying on the beach is entitled to more. 
But that reduces debates about inequality and equality to comparisons 
between individuals, whereas I very much agree with Anderson’s argument 
that the issues of inequality that compel us are ones that involve different 
classes of people assuming power, authority, superiority over others. 
Restoring the sense that it is group inequalities, social hierarchies and 
systemic exclusions and discriminations that make us an unequal society 
is critical.
I do, however, have some concerns about Anderson’s argument. There 
seems to be a mismatch between what she is arguing – much of which is 
hugely compelling – and the political challenges that face us in Britain in 
the immediate future. Rightly or wrongly, many people today actually think 
that the social hierarchies associated with ascriptive group identities have 
been dealt with. There is a very widespread view that this has somehow 
been addressed through antidiscrimination legislation, which supposedly 
provides us with equal pay and equality between the sexes, and laws 
against racism or incitement of religious and racial hatred. We even have 
gay marriage. And so for a lot of people, when they look back over the last 
20 or 30 years of British politics, their sense is that there have been a lot of 
advances in terms of those kinds of ascriptive group hierarchies. However, 
what we have absolutely failed to do is to address income inequalities. 
For so many people on the left it has felt as though no one is really 
addressing the gap between the rich and the poor; the increase in the 
number of children living in poverty; the absolute decline in real incomes 
over the last five years (mirroring what has happened in the US for a long 
time); the reliance on food parcels distributed by charities. Theoretically, I 
am very much in tune with Professor Anderson in that these are not things 
to be pitted against one another – it is not as though you focus either on 
resources or on the power relations and the ways in which people assert 
their superiority over others. Also, clearly, if you have a society which is 
very deeply divided between the rich and poor, then that does sustain all 
kinds of social hierarchy, in terms of contempt for the poor. In recent British 
politics, in particular, we have seen the demonisation of welfare recipients, 
who are treated like dirt in the public discourse. It is not that these things 
are counterposed, but there is a sense that at this particular political 
juncture, it is encouraging the wrong kinds of initiative to be saying that the 
distributional questions have been overstated and what we need to talk 
about are the hierarchies between ascriptive groups. 
The issue is not so much a substantive disagreement with what Professor 
Anderson is saying; instead, I think it is a question of how one enables it 
to inform what one does in a political context where a lot of people think 
that the social hierarchies have been dealt with but distributional resource 
questions remain unaddressed. 
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Reply: Elizabeth Anderson
Stressing the importance of relations of equality does not deny the 
importance of distributive equality, but instead gives it a certain place in 
our thinking. In many contexts, equality of distribution is needed to secure 
a better-functioning democracy, and also to secure equality of dignity, 
which is perhaps a stronger concern in the UK than in the US, where for 
cultural reasons stigma has not been so tightly attached to class identity. 
And equality of distribution is needed to ensure that everyone’s interests are 
really being taken into account by the mainstream institutions of society – 
not just the state but the market as well. 
For example, if we look at the history of concerns about distribution, there 
is this older republican tradition which Ben Jackson alludes to which is 
very worried about concentrations of wealth at the top. We do know that 
it is practically a natural law that when you have extreme inequality and 
enormous wealth concentrated at the top then the wealthy will capture 
the political process and you get plutocracy. That is highly relevant today: 
political scientists who have looked at the responsiveness of Congress in 
the US to different classes of voters ranked by income have discovered that 
lawmakers essentially ignore the political preferences of everybody except 
those at the top, because that is where their campaign contributions are 
coming from. 
This links to one of the points that Anne Phillips makes about how there 
seems to have been genuine progress on some hierarchies, such as 
sexual orientation. The reason for that is that elites are divided: you have 
a lot of people in the top 1 per cent who care about gay rights, and so the 
system responds.
It is absolutely critical for a functioning democracy to avoid this form 
of plutocracy. There have to be some kind of constraints at the top for 
purely political democratic reasons; otherwise you simply cannot have a 
functioning democracy where citizens are truly treated as equals.
Another point to be made about distribution is to ask why income inequality 
has increased so dramatically. No serious argument can be made that 
increases in income inequality have been to the benefit of everyone – 
quite the contrary. We have a lot of evidence from the 2008 crash that the 
increased concentration of wealth is actually shifting a lot of the burden and 
risks to the rest of the population while the people at the top reap the gains. 
The Occupy movement highlighted just this point with its slogan ‘we are 
the 99 per cent’. This is the idea that the system is rigged and that the 
constitutive rules of a capitalist economy – of banking, finance, bankruptcy 
and intellectual property – have been systematically rewritten so as 
to redistribute income to the top at the expense of the rest. Because 
democratic processes have been captured by the top 1 per cent, the rules 
have been changed, whether in relation to bankruptcy, credit, access 
to higher education, tuition charges, intellectual property or access 
to mortgages.
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It is important to focus on the constitutive rules by which these inequalities 
are produced in the first place. Constitutive rules must be written in such a 
way that everyone has an interest in them, or else the fundamental equality 
of standing of individuals has not been respected.
So, my argument is not that we have to choose between distributive 
and relational concerns, but rather that we should see concerns about 
distribution as a way of causally thinking through what we have to do in 
order to achieve a society where individuals relate to each other as equals. 
Distribution is a very important instrument for realising a society of equals.
Elizabeth Anderson is professor of philosophy and women’s studies at 
the University of Michigan.
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